\n\tWhy should American Muslims be the subject of secretive investigations and surveillance if their religious values and practices do not threaten American
\n\tdemocratic values?\n\t<\/p>\n
<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Bernard Lewis identifies classical Islam as a theocracy on a par with that of ancient Israel: \u201cAmong the Jews, for whose beliefs Josephus coined the term
\n\t\u2018theocracy,\u2019 God was Caesar. For the Muslims, too, God was the supreme sovereign, and the caliph was his vice-gerent, \u2018his shadow on earth.\u2019\u201d2 However,
\n\tLewis draws a fine line of distinction in defining Islam as a theocracy. If one thinks of it in terms of the monarchy of England, Lewis argues that the
\n\tidea of a monarch as a supreme ruler resonates perfectly with the concept of Tawhid in Islam, of God as Supreme Sovereign. But, if one thinks of theocracy
\n\tfrom an ecclesial form, Islam cannot be classified as such, since it has never had a system of priests who might offer direct rule.3<\/p>\n
\n\tSimilarly, Irene Oh summarizes the arguments of Abdul Maududi regarding Islam not being a theocracy, and states, \u201cIn his understanding of democracy,
\n\tMaududi advocates popular rule, though not on the basis of the sovereignty of human beings. Rather, he advocates a democracy on the basis of the
\n\tsovereignty of God, whose will is carried out by people. The difference between a theocracy and a democracy in Islam, then, is that in a theocracy, only a
\n\tfew religious leaders represent God, whereas in an Islamic democracy, every person can act as a representative of God. All individuals in an Islamic
\n\tgovernment enjoy the rights accorded to them as caliphs and therefore exist as equals in government.\u201d4\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tFor this reason, Islamic political theorists consider Islam as the \u201cperfect democracy.\u201d\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tPerhaps a more detailed elaboration of Islamic democracy is needed at this point. According to Sayyid Abul A\u2019la Maududi, there are three principles
\n\tinvolved in Islamic democracy: Tawhid (unity of God), Risalat (prophethood) and Khilafat (vicegerency).5 The principle of Tawhid argues that God is the
\n\tCreator of the universe and that He is sovereign over all of it, including the inorganic elements. His will, expressed through commandments, is to be
\n\tobeyed by all of His creation. Commenting on the interrelated nature of God\u2019s rule remaining sovereign in order for human rule to remain intact, Seyyed
\n\tHossein Nasr remarks, \u201cEven the power given to human beings to both know and dominate things is legitimate only on the condition that they . . . continue
\n\tto remain subservient to that blinding Divine reality.\u201d6\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tRisalat is the medium through which God\u2019s law is communicated to humans. In Islam, this consists of two elements: the Quran as revealed to Muhammad and his
\n\tlife example (hadith) of its application, collectively known as Shari\u2019ah.7 Each follower of Islam is expected to incorporate these teachings into his or
\n\ther life, indicating complete submission to Allah. As Ebrahim M. A. El-Khouly states: \u201cCommitting oneself sincerely to the One God entails committing
\n\toneself to adherence to His law, which can only be obtained through His Messenger . . . \u2018Whoever obeys the Messenger thereby obeys God (iv:80).\u201d8\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tSince all Muslims are expected to adhere to Shari\u2019ah as a sign of submission to Allah, they may rightly fulfill Khilafat (representation, or vicegerency).
\n\tChoudhury explains, \u201cMan, according to Islam, is the representative of God on earth, His vicegerent. That is to say, by virtue of the powers delegated to
\n\thim by God, he is required to exercise his God-given authority in this world within the limits prescribed by God.\u201d9 Since every person in Islamic society
\n\tenjoys the powers of caliphate, they are equal. Thus, matters of state will represent the will of the people and the state\u2019s authority will merely be
\n\tderivative of the extended power of the people.10\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tChoudhury notes the fundamental difference between Western democracy (popular sovereignty) and Islamic democracy (popular Khilafat): \u201cIn the former the
\n\tpeople make their own laws; in the latter they have to follow and obey the laws (Shari\u2019ah) given by God through His prophet. In one the government
\n\tundertakes to fulfill the will of the people; in the other the government and the people alike have to do according to the will of God.\u201d11<\/p>\n
\n\tHe recognizes that \u201cthe separation of state and religion in modern western societies produced a clear separation between the realms of religious and
\n\ttemporal affairs,\u201d leading to an independent development of social and religious, political and ethical, thought.12 He adds, however, that \u201cin a
\n\treligiously based socio-political system,\u201d like that of Islam, \u201cthis separation does not exist.\u201d13 Thus, an Islamic democracy as advocated by Choudhury
\n\tdoes not resonate fully with modern concepts of democracy, especially with respect to the role of religion.14 In some Islamic countries, apostasy (defined
\n\tas converting out of the Islamic faith) is punishable by death.\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tOther scholars, however, are investigating ways of accommodating Islamic beliefs and practice to democratic values. In The Rights of God: Islam, Human
\n\tRights, and Comparative Ethics, Irene Oh weaves a contemporary dialogue between three prominent Islamic intellectuals, one of which is \u2019Abdolkarim Soroush.
\n\tHe posits a \u201csofter\u201d form of democracy, which he refers to as \u201creligious democracy.\u201d She describes him as having \u201cgained increasing prominence for both his
\n\tintellectual and political roles in Iran and the larger Shi\u2019ite community.\u201d15 His concept of \u201creligious democracy\u201d envisions a democratic state that would
\n\tallow for both \u201creligious and nonreligious reasoning.\u201d16 He argues that justice trumps religion and that the means to justice is through democracy;
\n\ttherefore, religion must adapt to democracy and not viceversa.17 He thus believes that \u201ca democratic religious government requires extra-religious
\n\treasoning, including rational findings, as a sounding board for religious belief.\u201d18 Nonreligious reasoning is necessary to counterbalance any religious
\n\texpression that has gone astray.\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tI. William Zartman recognizes the dilemma of religion and politics in a democratic system that Soroush attempts to address. However, he offers several
\n\targuments against the compatibility of religion (Islam) and democracy. First, he notes that even under constitutional democracies, it is possible for
\n\treligious politicians to be elected who, although using democratic processes, can overturn a democratic form of government.19 In attempting to determine
\n\teach other\u2019s proper sphere, religion and government engage in a circular debate of legitimacy in which neither is willing to recognize the other\u2019s role.20
\n\tHe further identifies the complexities of political discourse in attempting to discern those who are religious politicians seeking office in order to
\n\testablish a religious order.21 Even the democratic process of electoral terms, usually short in duration, does not do justice to any potential religiously
\n\toriented political system, since the latter usually needs \u201cthe long run\u201d to show itself beneficial to the social structure.22 Ultimately he points to
\n\thistorical precedents showing the weakness of the argument that religiously oriented governments learn moderation when confronted with the inability of
\n\treligious principles and teachings to resolve complexities of modern politics—to the contrary, history shows they become more obdurate in their course.23\n\t<\/p>\n
<\/strong><\/h2>\n
In response to some of Zartman\u2019s critiques, John L. Esposito observes that critics of Islamist movements who state that they use electoral politics to
\n\thijack democracy fail to apply an equal critique to rulers of those countries who apply democratic principles, but only under conditions that will favor
\n\tthem remaining in power.24 Both are an abuse of democratic principles and systems of government. Additionally, the supposed global \u201cIslamic threat\u201d has
\n\tprovided support by Western powers, or at least their silence, when Islamist movements are suppressed.25 Under such conditions, Islamist movements resort
\n\tto violence as their only option to repressive regimes.26 However, viable democratic strategies are possible when such concepts as an open marketplace are
\n\ttaken into consideration, by which Islamist movements must adapt their views and positions in order to appeal to a broader constituency.27 Finally,
\n\tEsposito calls upon lessons from history that remind us of the length of time involved for the development of Western democratic nations: \u201cAll are
\n\tchallenged to recognize that democratization and the building of strong civil societies in the Muslim world are part of a process of experimentation,
\n\tnecessarily accompanied by failure as well as success. The transformation of the West from feudal monarchies to democratic nation states took time, trial
\n\tand error. It was accompanied by political as well as intellectual revolutions that rocked both state and church in a long, drawn-out process, among
\n\tcontending voices and factions with competing visions and interests.\u201d28<\/p>\n
\n\tSince Islam contains principles that allow for compatibility with democratic norms, it is necessary to explore American Muslim interaction with religious
\n\tpluralism in an American context.\n\t<\/p>\n
<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Although speaking in the context of Article 18 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of religion and the right to
\n\tchange one\u2019s religion, Fatema Mernissi correctly identifies the underlying philosophical tension existing between democratic concepts of freedom of
\n\treligion and pluralism and Islamic resistance to such notions.29 She identifies such freedom of religion with the Islamic concept of shirk, \u201cthe freedom to
\n\tthink and choose one\u2019s religion,\u201d30 which in Islamic history is associated with jahiliyya, \u201cthe chaotic pagan world before Islam.\u201d31 Thus, shirk is exactly
\n\tthe opposite of islam; whereas the former is the chaotic, disorderly element in the universe, the latter is order on earth and in heaven through submission
\n\tto Allah. She concludes by stating, \u201cIt is in that brief Article 18 and the concept of shirk that the conflict between Islam and democracy lies as a
\n\tphilosophical debate.\u201d32<\/p>\n
\n\tMoving from the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a philosophical link exists between it and the concept of religious freedom
\n\tguaranteed in the First Amendment of the American Constitution—the link is that of Enlightenment thought. Enlightenment concepts formed a large part of the
\n\tintellectual milieu prevalent during the founding era in American history, and later, more advanced concepts of the same formed the basis for Article 18 of
\n\tthe U.N. Declaration.33 Thus, some fundamental concepts inherent to Islam are at odds with philosophical foundations of American religious freedom. In
\n\torder for Islam, in its historic conceptualization, to embrace American ideals of religious freedom, it must undergo a reformulation, an ijtihad, that will
\n\tbring it into harmony with the latter.\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tJohn L. Esposito reemphasizes this need when he identifies parallels between Roman Catholic struggles with religious pluralism in America and those faced
\n\tby Islamic communities. He states: \u201cA critical issue in Muslim politics today is that of pluralism. Historically, the monotheistic visions of both Islam
\n\tand Christianity and the belief of each that it possessed the final and complete revelation of God and was charged to call all to salvation resulted in
\n\tcompeting claims and missions and produced theological and political conflict. In the 19th and 20th centuries, much of mainstream Christianity grappled
\n\twith and came to grips with the realities of pluralism in the modern world. The outcome was the result of a process of reform in which doctrines were
\n\treexamined and reinterpreted. For example, Roman Catholicism in the late 19th and first half of the 20th century resisted and condemned much of what was
\n\ttermed \u2018modernism\u2019 (from popular sovereignty and elections to pluralism). However, at Vatican II the church for the first time officially recognized and
\n\taccepted pluralism.\u201d34\n\t<\/p>\n
\n\tBased on this historical precedent, Esposito suggests that Islamic scholars should engage in a reexamination and reevaluation of Islamic traditional
\n\tsources that link foundational principles of Islam with modern concepts of religious pluralism,35 a point that is developed more fully in the last section
\n\tof this article (read part 2 in the next issue of Liberty).\n\t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Why should American Muslims be the subject of secretive investigations and surveillance if their religious values and practices do not threaten American democratic values? Islamic Compatibility Bernard Lewis identifies classical Islam as a theocracy on a par with that of ancient Israel: \u201cAmong the Jews, for whose beliefs Josephus coined the term \u2018theocracy,\u2019 God was<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[305],"tags":[137],"class_list":["post-6300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-march-april-2015","tag-march-april-2015"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6300"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6300\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.charming-bohr.160-238-31-172.plesk.page\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}